Monthly Archives: January, 2013

2012 Season in Review: Los Angeles Dodgers

86-76, 2nd in the NL West

It was a big year for the Dodgers. They had a strong first half and were in contention for a wild card birth deep into September, but the big stuff happened off the field. They were sold by the McCourts to Stan Kasten, Magic Johnson, and co for $2 billion. They’re finalizing a deal with FOX for TV rights worth around $6 billion. And they also took on every bad contract they could find. This was a year of changes for the Dodgers.

Looking at WAR for position players won’t tell much of the story here because only two of them played more than 130 games, and one of those was a catcher! Injuries and trades limited playing time so the accumulative nature of WAR won’t tell the whole story. Kemp, Either, the Ellises, and Cruz led the way, but Adrian Gonzalez, Shane Victorino, and Hanley Ramirez were among those who contributed over a couple of months.

Clayton Kershaw had another phenomenal season (5.5 WAR) in front of Chad Billingsly (2.7) and Chris Capuano (2.1). Aaron Harang (1.5) did nicely for a fifth starter, but if you’ve been counting, we’re only at four. The rest of the starts were scattered around. The bullpen had some nice pieces, but nothing otherworldly.

The big story of the season was the changing of the guard. Kemp and Either have new deals and a ton of other players have come on board. Carl Crawford, Adrian Gonzalez, Hanley Ramierard. Kemp and Either have new deals and a ton of other players have come on board. Carl Crawford, Adrian Gonzalez, Hanlrez, Josh Beckett, and Zach Greinke are among the new faces who will be with the Dodgers in 2013 who weren’t there on Opening Day of 2012.

Certainly the Dodgers ability to spend lots of money instead of no money will make them better, but there is some debate about how much better they’ve really gotten as a result of these moves. I’m of the opinion that they’re still not a lock for the playoffs because they have a lot of question marks.

They won 86 games in 2012, but some of that was good fortune in the early days of the season. Their true ability was probably closer to 81-81 in my book. They’ll add five wins from Greinke and three or four from Gonzalez and Ramirez over what they got in 2012, but I think most of the other moves are probably a wash. They’ll be better in 2013, but I don’t think their massive payroll will guarantee them anything.

2012 Grade: C

Early 2013 Projection: 89-73

2012 Season in Review: Arizona Diamondbacks

81-81, 3rd in the NL West

After a somewhat surprising and excellent 2011, the Diamondbacks took a step back in 2012 due to some regression to the mean and regression to the disabled list. The club won half its games, so it wasn’t a disaster, but expectations were moderately high, so it feels like a step back.

Four Dbacks outfielders played 100 games or more and posted starter or better WARs. Chris Young (2.8), Justin Upton (2.5), Gerado Parra (2.0), and Jason Kubel (1.8 so almost) made up a good outfielder, but it looks disappointing because Upton played so far below his ability. Second basemen Aaron Hill (6.2) had a monster year and hit two cycles, so you can’t complain about that. Paul Goldschmidt (3.7) played a good first base and Miguel Montero (5.0) had another great year behind the dish. Really, the left side of the infield is the only really area in need of upgrade on offense.

The starting pitching wasn’t bad either, even if Ian Kennedy (3.1) wasn’t a top line guy again and Daniel Hudson got hurt. Wade Miley (4.6) stepped in nicely and Trevor Cahill (3.4) fit in well. The other two spots in the rotation were trouble as the Snakes mixed and matched with some veterans and youngsters. The bullpen did well enough to keep them relevant.

A .500 team isn’t a great team, but this one has the makings of one. They traded Chris Young and signed Cody Ross. They have Adam Eaton waiting for an outfield spot too. They added some middle infield depth and bullpen reclamation projects this offseason. They dealt top prospect Trevor Bauer in the process, but added fragile yet very good Brandon McCarthy to fill the void not to mention a lot of good starting pitching working its way up the farm system.

The Dbacks didn’t turn heads in 2012, but with some retooling and a couple bounce back seasons, they have a shot to improve in 2013. Unfortunately, there are a number of NL teams on the rise, so that might not be so easy.

2012 Grade: C

Early 2013 Projection: 80-82

2012 Season in Review: San Diego Padres

76-86, 4th in the NL West

You might not believe this, but the Padres had a pretty respectable season in 2012. 76 wins isn’t something to pop bubbly over, but the team was far from the pushover farce that they have been in years past and were quite formidable down the stretch.

Chase Headley led the way with an MVP caliber season (7.5 WAR) and he had help from his friends, Cameron Maybin (2.7), Will Venable (2.7), Yasmani Grandal (2.6), Carlos Quentin (2.0), and Yonder Alonso (2.0). A couple other players posted near 2.0 win seasons, so when you look at the Padres offense as a whole; it’s actually not that bad. If you don’t like homeruns (which no one can hit at PETCO), the Padres were a downright…good offense.

The bullpen was pretty good, but the starters struggled to stay on the field. Only two made a full season of starts. Lots of the typical rate statistics put the Padres in the middle of the pack as a pitching staff, but WAR hates them because they get such a boost from their home ballpark.

Your view of their staff depends on how much you want to remove context from the equation, but you can’t call them good by any standard.

The farm is deep in San Diego and with new ownership and TV money, the franchise should be on the way up. They have a nice core of young players to build around and a few impact upgrades could put them right in the thick of contention.

I doubt 2013 will be a playoff year for the Padres, but they could push .500 and take a step toward being a legitimate contender in the near future.

2012 Grade: D

Early 2013 Projection: 77-85

 

2012 Season in Review: Colorado Rockies

64-98, 5th in the NL West

The Rockies were really bad in 2012. Usually I make an attempt at wit in the opening lines of a recap, but that’s all there is to be said. The Rockies were bad.

Their best hitter, Dexter Fowler, posted a 2.9 WAR and Carlos Gonzalez (2.7) and Tyler Colvin (2.7) are the only others above the 2.0 threshold. Granted their best player, Troy Tulowitzki, only played 47 games, so he likely would have made a run at something like a good season. The Rockies get help at home to make their traditional offensive numbers look good, but their batting average dropped from first in baseball at home to 26th in baseball when they went on the road.

Their staff as a whole was 23rd in baseball by WAR, but they were first in embarrassing attempts to limit pitch counts and use an ill-advised four man rotation! Let’s put it this way, their best pitcher by WAR in 2012 was a reliever. Matt Belisle, who was actually good, made 80 relief appearances on his way to a 2.1 WAR. None of their starters topped 1.8.

Yes, it was that bad. They went with a 75 pitch limit for starters no matter what and down to four starters to adjust for how bad they were and of course that made it worse.

Health will improve the Rockies going forward but the team isn’t built very well. With full seasons from their stars, I think the offense is good enough to contend in the NL West, but the pitching is simply too terrible for it to even matter.

It is very hard to get free agent pitchers to go to Colorado and drafting pitching is difficult as well. It only takes a few good luck seasons to get back into contention, but right now, this is easily the worst team in a division that includes the Padres.

It was a dark 2012 for the Rockies and 2013 doesn’t look a lot better. Tulo should be back and I don’t imagine the pitching can get worse, but their also up against some teams on the rise out west who will counteract those gains.

2012 Grade: F

Early 2013 Projection: 64-98

Lineup Protection: Fact or Fiction?

Among members of the traditional baseball community, lineup protection is a well-accepted truth. Among many members of the sabermetric community, lineup protection is a myth. Both can’t be right, but I’m sure not sure we know which side is.

First off, let’s define the term. Lineup protection is the idea that the hitter who hits behind you impacts how you perform based on a pitcher’s willingness to attack the zone against you versus pitching around you to face the next hitter. Let’s go a little further.

1) Protection assumes that it is better for Hitter 1 to see pitches in the strikezone because those pitches are easier to hit, therefore, protection increases your offensive numbers that do not include walks.

2) Protection assumes that a pitcher has some ability to control whether or not they throw you strikes versus balls in an at bat.

3) If you are “protected” you will see fewer pitches outside the strikezone, thus giving you a better chance to produce offensive numbers.

Now the sabermetric community points to evidence that says protection is myth because it hasn’t been shown to matter in any of the cases in which it could be tested. But a reasonable person would point out that to conduct a valid test, we would have to control for factors that we cannot control for in real life. We can’t randomly assign pitchers. We can’t hold the quality of the Hitter 1 constant. Even if you try to do that in a statistical sense, the sample size gets too small to have findings of any real significance.

The sabr crowd will tell you that the absence of evidence for protection means the burden of proof is place on those supporting it, and that’s a fine request in the abstract, but my aim isn’t to litigate an argument, it’s to see if protection is a thing or not.

More specifically, I want to see if protection should exist. In other words, should the hitter behind you impact how you get pitched?

I argue that it should and I’ll lay out my reasoning here. I can’t present an argument that protection does happen because it would be impossible to show that it does while maintaining a valid design, but I can present the argument that protection should exist using the 2012 Detroit Tigers.

Our Hitter 1 in this design is Miguel Cabrera. In 2012, Prince Fielder hit behind him and “protected” him. I will use their 2012 stats to craft their abilities, but these numbers could be adjusted if you prefer to track likelihoods by career numbers, monthly numbers, etc. Does Fielder’s presence behind Cabrera change the way a pitcher should attack Cabrera? I argue that it should.

Let’s look at this in the simplest terms possible. No one on, no one out. Cabrera leads off the inning, Fielder due up second.

In this scenario, Miguel Cabrera will get a base hit 33% of the time if the pitcher does not walk him (assuming Cabrera doesn’t know the pitcher will choose not to walk him). Fielder will get a base hit 31.3% of the time under the same conditions.

But not all base hits are the same. A walk and a single in this scenario have the same outcome for Cabrera, but doubles, triples, and homeruns are more damaging. Here, the pitcher would choose to walk Cabrera in all cases in which he would get a hit that wasn’t a single.

.33(batting average)*.41(% of hits that are for extra bases) = .1353

Regardless of who hits behind Cabrera, 13.5% of the time it is a better choice to walk Cabrera instead of pitching to him. If you don’t walk Cabrera, he will get an extra base hit 13.5% of the time, so you should walk him in those cases, but the other 86.5% of the time he will make an out (better) or single (equal).

So now let’s introduce his protector. Fielder gets a hit 31.3% of the time and 35% of his hits are for extra bases. This is important here because if Fielder gets an extra base hit, it is irrelevant what Cabrera did. If Cabrera gets a hit and then Fielder doubles, triples, or homers, Cabrera will score regardless of what base he occupied.

What we care about is how often Cabrera will get an extra base hit minus how often Fielder gets an extra base hit. We want to know how often we should walk Cabrera, so we need to see how often a Cabrera extra base hit will be followed by a Fielder single or out because a Fielder extra base hit would score a Cabrera walk.

Piece this all together and we discover that with none on and none out with Cabrera leading off and inning with Prince protecting him, walking Cabrera is the preferred choice 2.5% of the time.

This tells us that when Cabrera leads off an inning, 97.5% of the time, pitching to Cabrera will be the same or better than walking him with Fielder behind him. Obviously you can’t predict which 2.5% it will be, so you play the odds and always pitch to him when he leads off an inning.

How does this help us solve the problem? Should lineup protection matter?

It helps because if we insert the 2012 version of Delmon Young into this methodology, we should walk Cabrera 5.5% of the time. This still doesn’t tell us to walk Cabrera when he leads off an inning, but it tells us that we should walk him more to lead off an inning with Young behind him than if Fielder is.

This tells us that protection should matter. The hitter who bats behind you should impact the pitches you see. In practice, the likelihood of a walk being a smarter play with Young behind Cabrera means a pitcher should be more willing to pitch around Cabrera than if Fielder was behind him.

This becomes more evident when you add in baserunners and outs. I’m not going to walk through all the math in each of the 24 possible arrangements except to say that the more baserunners there are, the more valuable a walk can be over a hit. If a runner is on 2nd base, a walk is better than a single in the pitcher’s eyes, so the percentages slide in favor of a walk. However, you’re making a trade off because you are saying you like a 31.3% chance of a hit to a 33% of a hit when it comes to scoring the runner from second, but you are risking the chance that Fielder drives in Cabrera too.

The point of this entire piece is that the hitter behind Cabrera should matter. A pitcher should be more willing to pitch around Cabrera based on who hits behind him. That is hard to ignore, even if the percentages favor pitching to him in all scenarios. The important take away, however, is that it should also be a matter of degree.

Fielder and Young are dramatically different hitters. A very good hitter like Fielder matters over someone like Young, but would Fielder matter of Victor Martinez? Glad you asked.

Victor behind Cabrera means you should walk Cabrera 3.9% of the time in our scenario. So Prince is a better protector because he hits for extra bases more than Martinez does. But the difference is smaller than when Young is involved.

So, protection should matter, it’s a question of how much. A better hitter should protect you more than a lesser one and one who hits for more power should protect you more than one who hits more singles. It’s a sliding scale, so an overall difference would not be that evident unless the two potential protectors are significantly different both in reality and in the minds of the pitchers.

So while I cannot prove that protection exists, it absolutely should exists and should favor hitters with higher averages who get a lot of extra base hits. Additionally, since most baseball people believe it exists, that should reinforce its effect.

It should have a larger effect when pitchers and managers believe it exists. If they change their approach based on who hits behind someone because they believe it matters, then it will matter. Since it also should matter in a formal, logical sense as shown above, there is no other belief except to posit that lineup protection is a real thing, even if we can’t prove it.

The sabermetric response to this finding would likely be that even if it varies based on who hits behind you, the percentages always favor pitching to Cabrera over walking him. In other words, we never break 50.0%. This is true, but it misses something important. If 95% of the time you should pitch to Cabrera (and this is the extreme end), 1 out of 20 times, you should have walked him. This should impact you approach as a pitcher or you are being irrational. You should be more willing to walk Cabrera with Young behind him than Fielder even if your preference is to never walk him.

Protection should and probably does exist, even if the results are relatively small. Cabrera will not have a dramatically different season with Fielder or Young behind him, but we should observe differences, which means protection is likely a real phenomenon.